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To: Prof. Donsky From: Keran Peters Re: Famous Trial Date: May 2, 2012 One of the nation’s most famous trials was the Case of Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). Give the details of this case, the questions to keep in mind are: did the defendant have a fair first trial? Would the trial have a different outcome in today’s modern society? On July 4, 1954, Dr. Sheppard wife, Marilyn, was brutally murdered in the bedroom of their home in Bay Village, Ohio, on the shore of Lake Erie. Hours before the murder, Marilyn and Dr. Sheppard hosted a dinner party for a neighborhood friend. After dinner the couple watched a movie with their friends. Just before midnight Dr. Sheppard left his wife and his neighbors watching the rest of his movie. He moved to the daybed in the room, where he falls asleep. The coroner’s report showed that the death of Marilyn accrued between the time of 3:00 and 4:45 a.m. At 6:02 a.m. that morning Dr. Sheppard woke up and found his wife, Marilyn, dead, instead of calling 911; he called his friend Spencer Houk, the Mayor of Bay Village at the time. By 8:00 a.m. the police arrive on the scene. Dr. Sheppard was immediately suspected of murdering his wife. He was taken to a hospital and was treated for injuries to the head and the neck that he got from the struggle with an intruder. Dr. Sheppard was integrated investigating officers by for hours and days by the, but still he did not plead guilty. On August 17, 1954, a grand jury indicted Dr. Sheppard on first degree murder. He was represented by Bill Corrigan and Francis Lee Bailey Jr., commonly referred to as F. Lee Bailey. The prosecutor was John Mahon, which based his case on the coroner suggestions that the mark on Marilyn’s pillow was done with a surgical instrument. The trial took place in Cleveland before Judge “Edward Blythin”; who denies Dr. Sheppard the motion to change venue, even though the case were over publicize by the media. Newspaper articles emphasized that the evidences collected at the scene of the crime highly incriminates Dr. Sheppard and it points out that there were flaws in his statements. The same time the media was incriminating Dr. Sheppard, He wrote letters and articles to the press stating his innocence. The jurors in the case were constantly exposed to the media. Most of them read the Cleveland papers or had the papers delivered to their homes. They watched or heard all of the broadcasts about the case. Even pictures of jurors deliberating in the jury room appeared in the papers daily. They jurors were allowed to oversee the scene of the crime. Days before the verdict was rendered a new paper showed the jurors posing for photographs. Basically most of the jurors became somewhat of a celebrity during the trial. On December 21, 1954 The United State District Court of Ohio found the defendant guilty of second degree murder. He sentenced to life in prison. On January 3, 1955, the District court denied the Dr. Sheppard the motion for a new trial, which he believed that numerous errors occurred. Again, the court denied a supplemental motion for a new trial on based on new evidence given by Paul Leland Kirk, a criminologist, who believed that Dr. Sheppard did not killed his wife; he demonstrated that the blood test found in the room did not come from Dr. Sheppard or his wife. While in prison, Dr. Sheppard mother committed suicide, his father died of cancer and his attorney Bill Corrigan also died. After the death his mother Dr. Sheppard wrote a letter stating that “Today my mother took her life as a result of American injustice.” An appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit for writ of habeas corpus for relief from confinement due to the unconstitutionality of trial because of allegedly prejudicial pretrial publicity. In the habeas corpus preceding the court amended some of the constitutional defects and imperfections in trial case. Some accusations were found without merit and the court dismisses them. But the court did look in to the four facts: “(1) newspaper publicity before and during the trial, which did not give Dr. Sheppard a fair trial, (2) the trial judge should have disqualified himself, (3) evidence that Dr. Sheppard had refused to take a lie detector test and that witness had taken such a test was improperly brought before the jury, and (4) the bailiff in charge of the jury after the cause was submitted to improperly allowed individual jurors to make telephone calls to their families.” The Court of Appeal concluded that Dr. Sheppard did not have a fair trial and he was deprived of rights given to him by the United States Constitution. Judge’s O’Sullivan, Phillips, and Edwards, granted bail to Dr. Sheppard and release him from the Ohio State penitentiary. Once release from prison in July of 1964, Dr. Sheppard got remarried to Ariane Tebbenjohanns, a wealthy Germany woman. Throughout his years in prison, Dr. Sheppard corresponded with Ariane. By May of 1965 a second trial begins but special attention was given to insure the protection of Dr. Sheppard’s constitutional rights. The Supreme Court granted Dr. Sheppard Certiorari. The question to the court was “Whether Dr. Sheppard was deprived of a fair trial in his state of conviction for the second degree murder of his wife because of the trail judge’s failure to protect Dr. Sheppard Sufficiently from the massive, pervasive and prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution?” the court concluded that Dr. Sheppard did not receive a fair trial consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and, therefore the judgment of the U.S. District court Ohio such be reversed. Dr. Sheppard was release from prison. In two years he divorced his wife Ariane; the next year he became a professional wrestler, his name stage name was “killer Sheppard”. He got remarried to a Colleen Strickland. At age 46, he died of liver failure. I have given you the details of the case and the outside focus surrounding the case. Now we can answer the questions. Did the defendant have a fair trial? I will say no. This trial was use to send a message to society. The evidences gather from the crime a reasonable person would believe that Dr. Sheppard killed his wife. Since the Sixth Amendment to the United State Constitution state “all criminal prosecutions, the accused is shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, and by an impartial jury.” It was obvious that Dr. Sheppard did not receive an impartial. The second question, would the outcome of the case be different in today’s society? I say yes. Due to the media circus that surrounding the case, most judges would have allowed the defendant a change of venue to ensure that he had a fair trial. It is curtain that jury today would not be allowed to visit the sense of the crime or read any newspaper article that is pertaining to the case that would compromise their judgment to give the defendant a fair judgment. It is hard to say that if the case was tried today that the outcome of the case would be different, but I am sure that the defendant would not have had the opportunity to get a retrial on the terms that he did not have a first fair trial.

To: Prof. Donsky From: Keran Peters Re: Famous Trial Date: May 2, 2012 One of the nation’s most famous trials was the Case of Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). Give the details of this case, the questions to keep in mind are: did the defendant have a fair first trial? Would the trial have a different outcome in today’s modern society? On July 4, 1954, Dr. Sheppard wife, Marilyn, was brutally murdered in the bedroom of their home in Bay Village, Ohio, on the shore of Lake Erie. Hours before the murder, Marilyn and Dr. Sheppard hosted a dinner party for a neighborhood friend. After dinner the couple watched a movie with their friends. Just before midnight Dr. Sheppard left his wife and his neighbors watching the rest of his movie. He moved to the daybed in the room, where he falls asleep. The coroner’s report showed that the death of Marilyn accrued between the time of 3:00 and 4:45 a.m. At 6:02 a.m. that morning Dr. Sheppard woke up and found his wife, Marilyn, dead, instead of calling 911; he called his friend Spencer Houk, the Mayor of Bay Village at the time. By 8:00 a.m. the police arrive on the scene. Dr. Sheppard was immediately suspected of murdering his wife. He was taken to a hospital and was treated for injuries to the head and the neck that he got from the struggle with an intruder. Dr. Sheppard was integrated investigating officers by for hours and days by the, but still he did not plead guilty. On August 17, 1954, a grand jury indicted Dr. Sheppard on first degree murder. He was represented by Bill Corrigan and Francis Lee Bailey Jr., commonly referred to as F. Lee Bailey. The prosecutor was John Mahon, which based his case on the coroner suggestions that the mark on Marilyn’s pillow was done with a surgical instrument. The trial took place in Cleveland before Judge “Edward Blythin”; who denies Dr. Sheppard the motion to change venue, even though the case were over publicize by the media. Newspaper articles emphasized that the evidences collected at the scene of the crime highly incriminates Dr. Sheppard and it points out that there were flaws in his statements. The same time the media was incriminating Dr. Sheppard, He wrote letters and articles to the press stating his innocence. The jurors in the case were constantly exposed to the media. Most of them read the Cleveland papers or had the papers delivered to their homes. They watched or heard all of the broadcasts about the case. Even pictures of jurors deliberating in the jury room appeared in the papers daily. They jurors were allowed to oversee the scene of the crime. Days before the verdict was rendered a new paper showed the jurors posing for photographs. Basically most of the jurors became somewhat of a celebrity during the trial. On December 21, 1954 The United State District Court of Ohio found the defendant guilty of second degree murder. He sentenced to life in prison. On January 3, 1955, the District court denied the Dr. Sheppard the motion for a new trial, which he believed that numerous errors occurred. Again, the court denied a supplemental motion for a new trial on based on new evidence given by Paul Leland Kirk, a criminologist, who believed that Dr. Sheppard did not killed his wife; he demonstrated that the blood test found in the room did not come from Dr. Sheppard or his wife. While in prison, Dr. Sheppard mother committed suicide, his father died of cancer and his attorney Bill Corrigan also died. After the death his mother Dr. Sheppard wrote a letter stating that “Today my mother took her life as a result of American injustice.” An appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit for writ of habeas corpus for relief from confinement due to the unconstitutionality of trial because of allegedly prejudicial pretrial publicity. In the habeas corpus preceding the court amended some of the constitutional defects and imperfections in trial case. Some accusations were found without merit and the court dismisses them. But the court did look in to the four facts: “(1) newspaper publicity before and during the trial, which did not give Dr. Sheppard a fair trial, (2) the trial judge should have disqualified himself, (3) evidence that Dr. Sheppard had refused to take a lie detector test and that witness had taken such a test was improperly brought before the jury, and (4) the bailiff in charge of the jury after the cause was submitted to improperly allowed individual jurors to make telephone calls to their families.” The Court of Appeal concluded that Dr. Sheppard did not have a fair trial and he was deprived of rights given to him by the United States Constitution. Judge’s O’Sullivan, Phillips, and Edwards, granted bail to Dr. Sheppard and release him from the Ohio State penitentiary. Once release from prison in July of 1964, Dr. Sheppard got remarried to Ariane Tebbenjohanns, a wealthy Germany woman. Throughout his years in prison, Dr. Sheppard corresponded with Ariane. By May of 1965 a second trial begins but special attention was given to insure the protection of Dr. Sheppard’s constitutional rights. The Supreme Court granted Dr. Sheppard Certiorari. The question to the court was “Whether Dr. Sheppard was deprived of a fair trial in his state of conviction for the second degree murder of his wife because of the trail judge’s failure to protect Dr. Sheppard Sufficiently from the massive, pervasive and prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution?” the court concluded that Dr. Sheppard did not receive a fair trial consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and, therefore the judgment of the U.S. District court Ohio such be reversed. Dr. Sheppard was release from prison. In two years he divorced his wife Ariane; the next year he became a professional wrestler, his name stage name was “killer Sheppard”. He got remarried to a Colleen Strickland. At age 46, he died of liver failure. I have given you the details of the case and the outside focus surrounding the case. Now we can answer the questions. Did the defendant have a fair trial? I will say no. This trial was use to send a message to society. The evidences gather from the crime a reasonable person would believe that Dr. Sheppard killed his wife. Since the Sixth Amendment to the United State Constitution state “all criminal prosecutions, the accused is shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, and by an impartial jury.” It was obvious that Dr. Sheppard did not receive an impartial. The second question, would the outcome of the case be different in today’s society? I say yes. Due to the media circus that surrounding the case, most judges would have allowed the defendant a change of venue to ensure that he had a fair trial. It is curtain that jury today would not be allowed to visit the sense of the crime or read any newspaper article that is pertaining to the case that would compromise their judgment to give the defendant a fair judgment. It is hard to say that if the case was tried today that the outcome of the case would be different, but I am sure that the defendant would not have had the opportunity to get a retrial on the terms that he did not have a first fair trial.

To: Prof. Donsky From: Keran Peters Re: Thesis Statement Date: February 27, 2012 The Liability of Schools to Adequately Supervises And Protect Student From Injuries From Their Peers In The State Of New York. The lives of most pre-school and high school students are spent avoiding violence and injuries from their peers. My concern, is who should be held responsible, if a student is injured by another student while on school property? The New York education Code of Conduct on School Property §2801 (McKinney 2003) defines school property as, “within any building, structure, athletic playing field, playground, parking lot or land contained within the real property boundary line of a public elementary or secondary school; or in or on a school bus; a school function shall mean a school-sponsored or school-authorized extra-curricular event or activity regardless of where such event or activity takes place, including any event or activity that may take place in another state.” To help resolved matters of student injuries that occurred in school, due to the lack or insufficiency of supervision. Most courts are subjected to use The General Tort Liability of Public School agencies and Institutions of higher learning 38 A.L.R. 3d 380, and The New York Statute, 57 Am. Jur. 2d Tort Liability § 501 (2012). Under these Statutes and the case law of Miranda v. City of New York, 84 N.Y. 2d 44, 637 N.E. 2d 263, 614 N.Y.S. 2d 372 (1994) schools are “under a duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge and they will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision. In determining whether the duty to provide adequate supervision has been breached in the context of injuries caused by the acts of fellow students, it must be established that school authorities had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused injury. As to proximate cause, the test is whether under all the circumstances the chain of events that followed the negligent act or omission was a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the school’s negligence.” They are not, however, insurers of safety and will not be held liable “for every thoughtless or careless act by which one pupil may injure another” Lawes v. Board of Educ., 16 N.Y.2d 302, 266 N.Y.S.2d 364 (N.Y. 1965) In the case of Walley v. Bivins, 81 A.D.3d 1286, (4 Dept 2011), appeal from an order of the Supreme court of Onondaga county for granting defendant the order of summary judgment to dismiss complaint of . In the case, the plaintiff was a ninth grade student at school. The plaintiff was seeking damages for injuries she sustained when she was stabbed by Ashley Bivins, a seventh grade student at the school. It was undisputed that the school had knowledge of three altercations between the plaintiff and Ashley Bivins before the day of the stabbing. The first incident happened two weeks earlier, when the students were arguing and a teacher had to restrain Ashley Bivins to avoid an exchange of physical altercation. The second altercation, a volleyball coach stopped a physical altercation between the students on a school bus. The third incident, happened the following day, as soon as, plaintiff and Ashley Bivins entered the school. They had a physical fight and both were suspended for three days. The first day returning from their suspension, Ashley stabbed the plaintiff in the leg with a knife. The Appellate Court ruled that the Supreme Court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it. The court also ruled, that the school district will be held liable for negligent supervision of it students when school authorities has sufficient knowledge or advance notice of foreseeable conduct that cause the injury. The court went on to say that it could not have granted the defendant the motion to dismiss the case because the defendant was required to establish that there was no negligence on its part and that there was no breach of the duty of supervision, and if there was a breach that the breach was not a proximate cause, the chain of events that followed the negligent act or omission was a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by school’s negligence, of the injuries Mirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d 44. The court concluded, that the defendant could not dispute, that it did not breach its duty to supervision The school certainly could have reasonably anticipated that another altercation would occur when the students returned from their suspension because the previous ones. Summary judgment was denied. Again, the Appellate Division Fourth Department made the same ruling in the case of Johnson v. Ken-Ton Union Free School Dist., 48 A.D.3d 1276-127, 850 N.Y. 2d 813(4 Dept. 2008) a plaintiff seeking damages for injuries sustained by her son, a special education student that was injured by another special education student, Martin B., when they were allowed to use the bathroom together without supervision. The court ruled that school failed to establish that it did not have notice of Martin’s behavior. The court further concluded that the school could not establish that its breach of the duty of supervision was not a proximate cause of the injuries to the plaintiff’s son. Summary judgment was denied. Even though, New York Appellate Division Third Department has a different jurisdiction from the Fourth Department, it came to the same ruling in the case of Shoemaker v. Whitney Point Cent. School Dist., 299 A.D.2d 719, 750 N.Y.2d 355 (3 Dept. 2002) the court found the school liable for the injury that the plaintiff suffered at the hand of his classmate while playing on the playground. The school supported its motions for dismissal with evidence, which shows it had no reason to anticipate the altercation and that once the altercation started, it only lasted a short duration of time. The school also showed that the personnel could not have done anything to prevent to the plaintiff from being injured. Even though the school showed compelling evidence, the court still found that there were no school personnel present on the playground at the time of the incident. The court concluded that if there were school personnel’s to intercede the attack on the plaintiff behalf, the intervention may have prevented his injuries. In this case the defendant did not have to provide proximate cause, but they could not justify the lack of supervision on the playground. Summary judgment was denied and the court ruled in favor the plaintiff. In these three cases the court ruled in favor of the schools and the plaintiffs were denied liabilities. The plaintiff’s in cases of, Foster v. New Berlin Cent. School Dist., 246 A.D.2d 880, 667 N.Y.S.2d 994 (3 Dept.1998), Tomlinson v. Board of Educ. of City of Elmira, 183 A.D.2d 1023, 583 N.Y.s.2d 664 (3 Dept. 1992) and Schlecker v. connetquot Cent. School Dist. Of Islip, 150 A.D.2d 548, 541 N.Y.S.2d 127 (2 Dept. 1989), was dined liabilities on the grounds of inter alia, the court could not have found sufficient evidence to hold the schools liable for the injuries that the plaintiff’s obtain from there pupil. In the Foster case, the plaintiff was injured on the playground when the defendant Arthur Peek jumped on his leg and broke it. The court ruled that there no proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. Since the defendant and the plaintiff did not have and any prior altercation, there were no foreseeable reason that the school would of anticipated or prevented the incident from occurring. The incident only lasted a few moments; it was so sudden and spontaneous that the school was able to predict it. The court went on to say, that the manner in which, the injury occurred, it could not have been prevented, even if there were adequate supervision. The defendants was granted summary judgment to dismiss the action that it failure to maintain a safe environment and provide adequate supervision of the children. In the cases of Tomlinson, the defendant appeal from the Supreme Court of Chemung County to the Appellate Division, which denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing it’s the complaint. The plaintiff, Eric Tomilson was a sixth grade student at Riverside Elementary School in the City of Elimira, Chemung Country. Because of bad weather on the day of the incident the student were required to stay indoors rather than being allowed to go outside for recess. A class aide had to look over the students for the teacher while she was on her lunch break. Eric and other classmates were gathered around a table in the back of the classroom listening to tap recording with the use of earphones. Eric stand up to reset the volume on the tape recording, while sitting back down someone pulled the chain from underneath him; he fell hitting his head. Eric testified that there were no school personnel present in the classroom at the time the incident accrued. On behalf of her son, the plaintiff mother commenced an action against the Board of Education and School District. On the Appellate level the defendants was granted summary judgment. The court found that there were no proximate caused for the plaintiff’s injuries or that there were continuous chain of causation that would reasonably hold School and Board of Education, for negligent supervision in connection to the plaintiffs injuries. The Schlecker case, the Appellate Division reversed the order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County which denied the defendant the motion for summary judgment. The defendant Byron Murtha left his class without first obtaining a required pass from his teacher shortly after the commencement of the school day. He approached the plaintiff Robert Schlecker who was standing in front of his locker. They got into an argument and Byron allegedly hit Robert. Just like the Foster and Tomlinson , the court found that there were no factual basis to conclude defendant had any actual knowledge constituting “notice of a particular danger at a particular time” or that the altercation was not anticipated because the both student never had a pervious altercation. As parents, if you have questions of whom should be held liable for injuries that your child might have sustain during school hours, this is you answer. The cases that I have found, shows that the school will be held liable if the victims of the incidents or altercations can prove that there was proximate cause or that the school had advance notice or knowledge that the incident would likely occur. If the victims can’t provide such causations, the schools, or the Board of Education of City of New York will not be held liable. All Students while on school property is under the protection of the statutes for Tort Liability, it is impossible sue the aggressive student or their parents personally, but it is possible to sue the schools and be award damages if the elements that I stated must be proven.

To: Prof. Donsky From: Keran Peters Re: Thesis Statement Date: February 27, 2012 The Liability of Schools to Adequately Supervises And Protect Student From Injuries From Their Peers In The State Of New York. The lives of most pre-school and high school students are spent avoiding violence and injuries from their peers. My concern, is who should be held responsible, if a student is injured by another student while on school property? The New York education Code of Conduct on School Property §2801 (McKinney 2003) defines school property as, “within any building, structure, athletic playing field, playground, parking lot or land contained within the real property boundary line of a public elementary or secondary school; or in or on a school bus; a school function shall mean a school-sponsored or school-authorized extra-curricular event or activity regardless of where such event or activity takes place, including any event or activity that may take place in another state.” To help resolved matters of student injuries that occurred in school, due to the lack or insufficiency of supervision. Most courts are subjected to use The General Tort Liability of Public School agencies and Institutions of higher learning 38 A.L.R. 3d 380, and The New York Statute, 57 Am. Jur. 2d Tort Liability § 501 (2012). Under these Statutes and the case law of Miranda v. City of New York, 84 N.Y. 2d 44, 637 N.E. 2d 263, 614 N.Y.S. 2d 372 (1994) schools are “under a duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge and they will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision. In determining whether the duty to provide adequate supervision has been breached in the context of injuries caused by the acts of fellow students, it must be established that school authorities had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused injury. As to proximate cause, the test is whether under all the circumstances the chain of events that followed the negligent act or omission was a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the school’s negligence.” They are not, however, insurers of safety and will not be held liable “for every thoughtless or careless act by which one pupil may injure another” Lawes v. Board of Educ., 16 N.Y.2d 302, 266 N.Y.S.2d 364 (N.Y. 1965) In the case of Walley v. Bivins, 81 A.D.3d 1286, (4 Dept 2011), appeal from an order of the Supreme court of Onondaga county for granting defendant the order of summary judgment to dismiss complaint of . In the case, the plaintiff was a ninth grade student at school. The plaintiff was seeking damages for injuries she sustained when she was stabbed by Ashley Bivins, a seventh grade student at the school. It was undisputed that the school had knowledge of three altercations between the plaintiff and Ashley Bivins before the day of the stabbing. The first incident happened two weeks earlier, when the students were arguing and a teacher had to restrain Ashley Bivins to avoid an exchange of physical altercation. The second altercation, a volleyball coach stopped a physical altercation between the students on a school bus. The third incident, happened the following day, as soon as, plaintiff and Ashley Bivins entered the school. They had a physical fight and both were suspended for three days. The first day returning from their suspension, Ashley stabbed the plaintiff in the leg with a knife. The Appellate Court ruled that the Supreme Court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it. The court also ruled, that the school district will be held liable for negligent supervision of it students when school authorities has sufficient knowledge or advance notice of foreseeable conduct that cause the injury. The court went on to say that it could not have granted the defendant the motion to dismiss the case because the defendant was required to establish that there was no negligence on its part and that there was no breach of the duty of supervision, and if there was a breach that the breach was not a proximate cause, the chain of events that followed the negligent act or omission was a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by school’s negligence, of the injuries Mirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d 44. The court concluded, that the defendant could not dispute, that it did not breach its duty to supervision The school certainly could have reasonably anticipated that another altercation would occur when the students returned from their suspension because the previous ones. Summary judgment was denied. Again, the Appellate Division Fourth Department made the same ruling in the case of Johnson v. Ken-Ton Union Free School Dist., 48 A.D.3d 1276-127, 850 N.Y. 2d 813(4 Dept. 2008) a plaintiff seeking damages for injuries sustained by her son, a special education student that was injured by another special education student, Martin B., when they were allowed to use the bathroom together without supervision. The court ruled that school failed to establish that it did not have notice of Martin’s behavior. The court further concluded that the school could not establish that its breach of the duty of supervision was not a proximate cause of the injuries to the plaintiff’s son. Summary judgment was denied. Even though, New York Appellate Division Third Department has a different jurisdiction from the Fourth Department, it came to the same ruling in the case of Shoemaker v. Whitney Point Cent. School Dist., 299 A.D.2d 719, 750 N.Y.2d 355 (3 Dept. 2002) the court found the school liable for the injury that the plaintiff suffered at the hand of his classmate while playing on the playground. The school supported its motions for dismissal with evidence, which shows it had no reason to anticipate the altercation and that once the altercation started, it only lasted a short duration of time. The school also showed that the personnel could not have done anything to prevent to the plaintiff from being injured. Even though the school showed compelling evidence, the court still found that there were no school personnel present on the playground at the time of the incident. The court concluded that if there were school personnel’s to intercede the attack on the plaintiff behalf, the intervention may have prevented his injuries. In this case the defendant did not have to provide proximate cause, but they could not justify the lack of supervision on the playground. Summary judgment was denied and the court ruled in favor the plaintiff. In these three cases the court ruled in favor of the schools and the plaintiffs were denied liabilities. The plaintiff’s in cases of, Foster v. New Berlin Cent. School Dist., 246 A.D.2d 880, 667 N.Y.S.2d 994 (3 Dept.1998), Tomlinson v. Board of Educ. of City of Elmira, 183 A.D.2d 1023, 583 N.Y.s.2d 664 (3 Dept. 1992) and Schlecker v. connetquot Cent. School Dist. Of Islip, 150 A.D.2d 548, 541 N.Y.S.2d 127 (2 Dept. 1989), was dined liabilities on the grounds of inter alia, the court could not have found sufficient evidence to hold the schools liable for the injuries that the plaintiff’s obtain from there pupil. In the Foster case, the plaintiff was injured on the playground when the defendant Arthur Peek jumped on his leg and broke it. The court ruled that there no proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. Since the defendant and the plaintiff did not have and any prior altercation, there were no foreseeable reason that the school would of anticipated or prevented the incident from occurring. The incident only lasted a few moments; it was so sudden and spontaneous that the school was able to predict it. The court went on to say, that the manner in which, the injury occurred, it could not have been prevented, even if there were adequate supervision. The defendants was granted summary judgment to dismiss the action that it failure to maintain a safe environment and provide adequate supervision of the children. In the cases of Tomlinson, the defendant appeal from the Supreme Court of Chemung County to the Appellate Division, which denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing it’s the complaint. The plaintiff, Eric Tomilson was a sixth grade student at Riverside Elementary School in the City of Elimira, Chemung Country. Because of bad weather on the day of the incident the student were required to stay indoors rather than being allowed to go outside for recess. A class aide had to look over the students for the teacher while she was on her lunch break. Eric and other classmates were gathered around a table in the back of the classroom listening to tap recording with the use of earphones. Eric stand up to reset the volume on the tape recording, while sitting back down someone pulled the chain from underneath him; he fell hitting his head. Eric testified that there were no school personnel present in the classroom at the time the incident accrued. On behalf of her son, the plaintiff mother commenced an action against the Board of Education and School District. On the Appellate level the defendants was granted summary judgment. The court found that there were no proximate caused for the plaintiff’s injuries or that there were continuous chain of causation that would reasonably hold School and Board of Education, for negligent supervision in connection to the plaintiffs injuries. The Schlecker case, the Appellate Division reversed the order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County which denied the defendant the motion for summary judgment. The defendant Byron Murtha left his class without first obtaining a required pass from his teacher shortly after the commencement of the school day. He approached the plaintiff Robert Schlecker who was standing in front of his locker. They got into an argument and Byron allegedly hit Robert. Just like the Foster and Tomlinson , the court found that there were no factual basis to conclude defendant had any actual knowledge constituting “notice of a particular danger at a particular time” or that the altercation was not anticipated because the both student never had a pervious altercation. As parents, if you have questions of whom should be held liable for injuries that your child might have sustain during school hours, this is you answer. The cases that I have found, shows that the school will be held liable if the victims of the incidents or altercations can prove that there was proximate cause or that the school had advance notice or knowledge that the incident would likely occur. If the victims can’t provide such causations, the schools, or the Board of Education of City of New York will not be held liable. All Students while on school property is under the protection of the statutes for Tort Liability, it is impossible sue the aggressive student or their parents personally, but it is possible to sue the schools and be award damages if the elements that I stated must be proven.

KERAN PETERS EPORTFOLIO

KERAN PETERS EPORTFOLIO