The following is a paper I wrote for my Sociological Theory course at Central Connecticut State University regarding a debate between Michel Foucault and Noam Chomsky on human nature (please note, style of writing was done in American Sociological Association (ASA) format):

“Sociological theory largely emerged during two distinct periods in time: modernism and postmodernism. Modernism arose as a departure from, and the demise of the hierarchical system of feudalism. Whereas people looked to religion and tradition to determine their future in feudalism, now science became an advent of religion, in that people were looking to science and reason to push forward universal ideas of human progress. It was a radical move away from the rigid, predetermined structures of feudalism. Postmodernism then came about as essentially the result of the almost social revolution in 1968 France. It was a period of political pessimism marked by the rejection of science, the rejection of modernism’s claim that there is a global, universal truth; that instead, there were many truths, created and shaped by the historical context and power structures of that period. While postmodernism could not have existed without modernism, it was marked by the critical reevaluation on modernism, as well as a function of the social and political failures of 1968. Discussed in the following pages are the three main areas of contention between theorists of these two periods: the ideas of human nature, knowledge and science, as well as politics.

In the modernist position of Noam Chomsky, human nature is a scientific concept; it is “[… an] innate or organizing principles, which guides our social and intellectual and individual behavior […]” (Chomsky and Foucault 2006: 4-5), in that there is something biologically systematic and inherent in the way humans learn, behave and interact with each other. In essence, the very elementary starting point or basis for human interaction and discourse is the nature of our biological makeup. He further states the fact that “[…] this instinctive knowledge […] makes it possible to derive complex and intricate knowledge on the basis of very partial data, is [also another] fundamental constituent of human nature” (Chomsky et al. 2006:4). There is a specific scientific component to human nature in the way that we are able to take small, seemingly trivial information, and process it into complex systems of information and comprehension. Indigenous to humans Chomsky asserts, is intelligence, or the ability to connect through the use of language irrespective of social positions and historical time. When asked by an audience member as to what extent human nature is subject to historical changes, he responds:

“Well, I think that as a matter of biological and anthropological fact, the nature of human intelligence certainly has not changed in any substantial way […] That is, I think that the fundamental properties of our intelligence, […] are certainly very ancient; and that if you took a man from five thousand or twenty thousand years ago and placed him as a child within today’s society, he would learn what everyone else learns, and he would be a genius or a fool or something else, but he wouldn’t be fundamentally different” (Chomsky et al. 2006:33).

As far as Chomsky is concerned, human nature and intelligence are things that remain unscathed through linear historical periods. People’s ability and capacity for knowledge is something that is innate and does not change throughout the course of any and all space and time.

Michel Foucault on the other hand, taking the postmodernist stance, completely rejects the notion of human nature. He sees the self as being more a subject, subjected to the institutions of power. The individual can never be separate from power because according to Foucault, there is no pure, creative process in language and knowledge formation because it is something that is shaped by the workings of power structures. “One can only, in terms of language or of knowledge, produce something new by putting into play a certain number of rules which will define the acceptability or the grammaticality of these statements, or which will define, in the case of knowledge, the scientific character of the statements” (Chomsky et al. 2006:22). For him, new knowledge is created only on the basis that there is an already existing set of laws or “circumstances” even, confined within a set of limitations and boundaries; thus, needless to say, the sanction or approval of said knowledge is not based purely within the individual, but on the powers that placed the existing framework of knowledge construction. Foucault further maintains, “[…] I am speaking of knowledge itself, that is to say, I think of the content of various knowledges which is dispersed into society, permeates through that society, and asserts itself as the foundation for education, for theories, for practices, etc.” (Chomsky et al. 2006:29-30). Hence, human nature and knowledge establishment for Foucault is a systematic process and is a function of institutions of power already in place.

With the demise of feudalism where religion was the creator of all knowledge during this period, modernism pushed forward scientific knowledge as its successor. Empiricism and rationality came about as ways to uncover objective truths in helping society and individuals progress and realize their potential. A key theorist for this modernist position was Max Weber. Weber was concerned with the understanding (verstehen,) the causality, and the values of people and their actions. He felt that sociology had the ability to understand phenomenon, to explain why people behaved the way they did, and the meaning attached to their actions. A large part of Weber’s works centered around forming an empirical science for social life and social action. This was a science for him, and in no way could he believe that human behavior could ever be explained by law. As Weber states,

“Even with the widest imaginable knowledge of ‘laws,’ we are helpless in the face of the question: how is the causal explanation of an individual fact possible – since a description of even the smallest slice of reality can never be exhaustive? The number and type of causes which have influenced any given event are always infinite and there is nothing in the things themselves to set some of them apart as alone meriting attention” ([1904] 2008:79).

For Weber, laws have no truly scientific justification as it doesn’t explain individuality. Laws and individuals are a relationship in themselves, and thus do not conclusively explain people’s behaviors. For Weber, causes of action are endless, and therefore on an individual level, are inconsequential to explaining and interpreting actions and behaviors. Rather, it is the collective sum of these causes that have scientific value, which then calls for attention, understanding and interpretation. Weber further states, “[…] the more certain and more comprehensive our general knowledge the greater is the certainty of imputation” ([1904] 2008:80).

Where modernism’s goal is to find one grand, objective foundation or narrative of knowledge, postmodernism not only rejects the idea of such a totalizing knowledge, but the belief was that absolute knowledge was just not objective; the world was too complex for one collective theory to explain. This period was marked by the branching out of the universal science of modernism, to various areas of studies or hybrid knowledge relative to specific points in time and social conditions.

Jean-Francois Lyotard, one of leading postmodernists of this era argued that the modern, narrative-based knowledge that existed even in premodern times, created systems of social hierarchy and oppression. To Lyotard, “[…] in premodern societies, narratives were considered knowledge not because they corresponded to facts, but because they conformed to social rules that fixed who has the right to speak, to whom, and when” (Seidman 2008:163), it was an authoritative and oppressive structure of knowledge, and was subject to the storyteller’s interpretation. These “metanarratives” as Lyotard referred to them, already contained established views that did not necessarily mold and adapt itself with the changing times, as there was a marked shift in society towards computerization and increasing consumerism; therefore, the legitimacy or the lack of such in the modernist idea of grand universal knowledge bred increasing skepticism. For postmodernists, there is no one knowledge, no one truth, and no one language that can cater to all the complexities of the changing societies and people’s ever evolving realities.

Finally, in the political arena, unlike the areas of areas of human nature and knowledge in which the modern and postmodern view differed starkly, here they do pose some similarities. Karl Marx, one of the fathers of modernism, believed that through politics, humanity is able to progress by emancipating themselves from the power structures of capitalism and exploitation by revolting. According to Marx, the two main classes in this capitalist relationship are Bourgeoisies and Proletariats. Marx states that with the more power and capital gains the Bourgeoisies developed, there would be “a corresponding political advance of that class,” as well ([1872] 1988:57); by that he refers to the government and bureaucratic structures that are formed to advance and cement the power of Bourgeoisie in place. Embedded in all the class struggles of the Proletariats, there was an additional struggle to break down the existing political establishment. Marx believes that the demise of the Bourgeoisie is an absolute matter of when, and not if. As the exploitation and aim for capital gains increases, these ideals will become an increasingly grave source of conflict within society. Even though the ruling class is powerful, but they are also in the minority in terms of sheer numbers, whereas the Proletariats make up the majority. As the Bourgeoisie continue to dig their own graves, for Marx, this will only create such an immense conflict that it will inevitably lead to a [successful] revolution on the part of the working class to bring about change and liberation. Marx held an optimistic view of the future of progress of humanity and society through political revolutions stemming from the working class.

As mentioned, in regards to politics, modernist and postmodernists shared some similarities in that postmodernists also believe that capitalism is a system of hierarchy and oppression; that’s its sole existence is based on power relationships for capital gain. Foucault was heavily influenced by Marx in his earlier works, as he had a strong affinity and optimism for revolutionary movements that fractured and dismantled the power of the upper class. With the failure the 1968 revolution in France however, he broke away from Marx and became more pessimistic in the state of humanity. He explains his shift in views as due to the disciplinary society in which we live:

“That is why discipline fixes; it arrests or regulates movements; it clears up confusion; it dissipates compact groupings of individuals wandering about the country in unpredictable ways; it establishes calculated distributions. It must also master all the forces that are formed from the very constitution of an organized multiplicity; it must neutralize the effects of counterpower that spring from them and which form a resistance to the power that wishes to dominate it: agitations, revolts, spontaneous organizations, coalitions – anything that may establish horizontal conjunctions” ([1977] 1984:208-209).

Society for Foucault functions to protect and preserve the relationships of power. Any attempt to counter or neutralize it would be merely pointless as these power institutions are constructed and organized in such a way that you can’t restore any justice in capitalism without restoring the capitalist society itself. Capitalism according to Foucault is fundamental in our society. He doesn’t offer any concepts of progress. He is mostly concerned with history, and its transformation through various points in time. He is more or less an agitator of sorts, pointing out and criticizing faults, but never really giving recommendations. Foucault charges his point in the debate with Chomsky:

“[…] these notions of human nature, of justice, of the realization of the essence of human beings, are all notions and concepts which have been formed within our civilization, within our type of knowledge and our form of philosophy, and that as a result form part of our class system; and one can’t, however regrettable it may be, put forward these notions to describe or justify a fight which should – and shall in principle – overthrow the very fundaments of our society. This is an extrapolation for which I can’t find the historical justification” (Chomsky 2006:57-58).

To conclude, modernism and post modernism served as two periods in time where sociological theory on human nature, knowledge and science, and politics emerged. Both periods had different ideology concerning these areas. Modernism was a break away from the rigid system of to advance human progress and emancipation. It was a period marked with optimism towards a goal of universal freedom. With the failure though of the 1968 revolution in France, came postmodernism. It was a period of political pessimism, critiquing and reevaluating modernism. It rejected the notion of human nature and rejected the idea that there is one totalizing science or knowledge that could make sense of all the human and social complexities. With contrasting ideas, both periods provided framework for understanding and looking at the world we live in today.

Theory is what you understand it to be and what you can identify with, and for everybody, it’s different. Personally, I fall somewhere in the middle of the two, not fully identifying with one or completely rejecting the other. While most times, I am more inclined on the nurture part of the debate, but I do believe that as humans, it is biologically encoded in us to learn and to absorb, to take small bits of information and somehow process it into wide, complex array of knowledge. Our brains is the very starting point for all this to take place, it is just a matter of time and space that sets us apart, but how we come to take in this knowledge is all fundamentally the same. As Chomsky pointed out, take a man from thousands of years ago and place him into today’s society as a child, he would still learn and pick up what everyone else does. I believe in human nature and our capacity to absorb and process knowledge, I think that is the bane of our existence, and that is what connects people through space and time.

While we all biologically start out at the same point, I do not feel like there is one complete, all-encompassing knowledge that could explain all the complex facets of humans and societies. We are all intricate human beings, shaped by experiences that differ vastly from one another.  To suggest or believe that there is one science and knowledge that is applicable to me, and say, a person living in Ethiopia, or one living in France is absurd. Even though we all start out the same, this one grand narrative asserts that we remain the same to each other in further implying that we are not shaped by our experiences; it also doesn’t take into consideration that power is exerted differently for different groups in society. The modernist stance also imposes that struggles can be collectively reduced to one unifying conflict. The times of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber only took to consideration class struggles in their studies and theories, perhaps because that was the only major conflict of that time and of that place. But issues of sexuality, race, gender, etc., cannot all be subsumed under one grand conflict, such as class. Therefore issues surrounding science and knowledge need to be more inclusive by branching out to different studies that cater to the different struggles and experiences of society and its people. Knowledge has to be able to bend and mold to the changing times and spaces. The ploy of a totalizing knowledge is a rigid structure in and of itself.

Taking another postmodern stance, I question the objectivity of knowledge. I do believe that invariably, power is exercised through knowledge. What exactly is a fact? Is there such a thing? Or who decides that it is? I believe that there could be some objectivity in science, but it boils down to the scientist, the subjective interpretation and framing of said knowledge or fact in a way that proves or disproves what they want or do not want you to believe. Who decides what is normal? What is abnormal? What is right? What is wrong? And to whom are you presenting your facts? The concept of scientific truth is already suspect, and for me, the synergistic relationship that power and knowledge have with each other most certainly undermines its legitimacy. I believe that there is an agenda to interpret and spread knowledge only for the interest of maintaining power and exerting control over a society.

Lastly, while I don’t believe that a wide scale revolt, or even a fraction of the 1960’s will ever happen again, but I do hold out for the hope of some progression. It’s a thin line between slighted optimism and just downright pessimism. I am not a cynic, but it’s difficult to imagine something so dynamic happening again, but the possibility still remains. In considering all the theorists covered, and though I identify with Foucault the most, I cannot take his stance of criticize only and do nothing, completely. The larger part of me believes that nothing will ever change, and so doing nothing seems much more appealing and sensible even. But the other, smaller part of me also believes that if you just deflect the ship off course just a little in any which way you can, that it will one day end up in a completely different course; and that I would say, is progress.

Bibliography

Chomsky, Noam and Michel Foucault. 2006. The Chomsky-Foucault Debate On Human Nature. New York: New York Press.

Foucault, Michel. 1977/1984. “Panopticism.” Pp. 206-213 in The Foucault Reader, edited by P. Rainbow. New York: Pantheon Books.

Marx, Karl. 1872/1988. The Communist Manifesto, edited by F.L. Bender. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.

Seidman, Steven. 2008. Contested Knowledge: Social Theory Today, 4^th ed. UK: Blackwell Publishing.

Weber, Max. 1904/2008. “’Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy.” Pp. 76-81 in Social Theory: Roots and Branches, edited by P. Kivisto. UK: Oxford University Press.”