China traditionally has been an imperialist nation, perhaps the earliest predatory nation. The broad belt of countries that rings it had, for centuries, sent tribute to the larger, stronger, imperial court at Beijing. China’s imperial status fell, however, with the arrival of European imperialists, and later on, the Confucian system itself fell in favor of the eventual establishment of the People’s Republic. But once the other powers had left, several of China’s former tribute states became wary of the newly revitalized China, fearing that the new regime under the CCP would now attempt to reclaim its former glory and reassert itself as the dominant power of the east, using the historical observation that “a strong China has always been an expansionist China.” (Menon 6)
Indeed, shortly after the creation of communist China, the nation became actively involved in the revolutions of Korea and Vietnam, though China claimed it had done so simply to protect its own borders, and Burma was forced to cede territory in a border dispute. The question of exactly what the borders of China were was to become a hotly contested one in the second half of the twentieth century. Aside from Burma, and also the agreements with Pakistan, within thirty years of the founding of the People’s Republic, China would engage in armed conflict over territorial disputes with its three largest neighbors- India, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam.
The conflicts with India and Vietnam are complex in that they are not simple border disputes. In each case, three additional circumstances existed beside the disputed territory. In both cases, the events leading to the war were fueled by the presence and involvement of a third party, Tibet between China and India, and Cambodia between China and Vietnam. Also in both cases, the border disputes were, in part, the result of inadequate and incomplete negotiations between imperialists. India and Vietnam had the British and French on their side of the table to negotiate with the ethnically non- Chinese Manchus. The treaties that came out of these talks left the borders unresolved, and the task of the new, independent nations to resolve them. The third factor is the role played by the Soviet Union, and how the Sino- Soviet split affected relations between China, Russia, and the other nations of the Orient.
As the nineteenth century wound to a close, the British were in competition with the expanding Russian Empire. Moscow was moving not only east, but also south, prompting the British to look to seal off India’s northern borders and put an end to the Great Game. But in order to secure India’s border, the British would also have to negotiate with China, and more specifically, the province of Tibet. Tibet itself had long been the object of China’s western expansion, finally becoming incorporated under Qianlong after several other unsuccessful attempts. But, being a far distance from Beijing, and with the Qing having a slew of internal and external conflicts, such as the Taiping Rebellion, the imperial court could not do much to fully exercise authority over the region. Tibet then, was allowed to assume some mantle of autonomy. But even this was not without its difficulties, as Ladakh was annexed by Kashmir. (Maxwell 26) This annexation did not create too much difficulty, since China had claimed in 1847 that the border between Tibet and Ladakh was a solid one and needed no renegotiation.
There were other small areas that were also disputed, such as Hunza, a small kingdom adjacent to Kashmir that sent tribute both to India and China. The British later annexed this territory for India, though this also was seemingly not a huge problem since according to the Journal de St. Petersburg, the ruler of Hunza had ended the dispute by “placing himself under the dominion of the Empress of India and expelling a Chinese envoy.” (Lall 7) However, the Hunza region became a key to the British northern expansion, pushing India up into the Karakoram and Kuenlun passes, that had previously served as buffer areas. (Lall 51) In addition, the newly acquired territory would give the British more leverage against the Russians, and so the British claimed that they “cannot recognize Chinese rights” (Lall 11) in Hunza. Beijing, in a statement issued by the Zongli Yamen, simply said, ‘the Government of India ought not to have invaded the country without previously communicating with the Chinese government.’ (Lall 15)
Britain’s continuing expansion northward into the Himalayas went relatively unchecked until the 1890’s. The British followed a policy of encroaching on the buffer zone, annexing it to expand the territory of India, all while, under the policy of imperialism, applauding such action as “taking advantage of the absence of Chinese control south of the Kuenlun.” (Lall 70) By this time, the Chinese had seen enough and realized the importance of becoming actively involved in the abutting regions between India and Tibet. China had prior been left out of the talks between the British and the Russians. Neither empire had considered the weight of Peking might have in the dispute. China laid claim to the Aksai Chin area as part of Tibet. In addition, China refused to recognize British claims to Shahidula and the Karakesh River. The British admitted they had little to refute China’s claims to the area, because “though China never directly occupied it, they had taxed nomads.” (Lall 68) A further admission on the part of the British that China did indeed have a legitimate claim to the area was made by Macartney, who said that even though the Aksai Chin region would be better administered by the British, it was nonetheless Chinese territory. (Maxwell 31)
It was not until 1914 that the British attempted a meeting with the Chinese to delineate a permanent and concrete border between China and India. Tibet, with its semi-autonomous status, was the third party to negotiate at the Simla Convention. At this conference, British maps placed Aksai Chin in Tibet, and therefore China, as following an agreement with the Russians that the two imperial nations would cede the region to neutral China, and though China probably would not have objected, they were not involved in this agreement. (Maxwell 34) The inherent and glaring flaw on the part of the British at the Simla Conference was that the British negotiated with Tibet on an equal level, as though it were an independent nation, severely over- estimating its semi-autonomous status. The British failed to realize that Tibet is part of China, “with greater powers and functions than a province as laid down in the constitution and by law; but it is definitely not a protectorate- neither a Chinese protectorate, nor an Indian protectorate, nor a joint Chinese- Indian protectorate, nor a so- called buffer state between China and India.” (Vertzberger 155)
In addition, it would appear that the British had made covert arrangements with the Tibetans. Not only had the governments of India and Tibet already agreed on the proposals beforehand, but the Chinese delegate, Ivan Chen, was not even shown a complete map with all demarcations. (Hoffman 19) Chen made it clear that his initialing of the preliminary map he was shown was not to be taken as a sign of Chinese approval of the conference, but only an indication that he had seen the initial proposal, and the government in Beijing chastised him even for this. In addition, China made it clear it would not ratify the treaty. The initialing by Chen was to be his only function at the Simla Convention, as Chen was not present at follow up meetings where the maps he had initialed were revised and used as the final versions, thus concluding the three party conference between India, Tibet, and China with signatures from England and Tibet, and without an official Chinese signature. (Maxwell 48)
Thus, the Simla Convention had, in theory, laid out the border in the west between Tibet and Kashmir. In the east, the border between Assam and Tibet was still to be drawn. For this convention, no delegate from Beijing was present. The creation of the McMahon Line was seeped in blind British imperialism and complete disregard for the Chinese central government. When the line was drawn hastily, secretly, and agreed on by the British and Tibet, the British had violated treaties it had signed with both China and Russia that required communication between the nations in such affairs as safeguards during the Great Game. (Maxwell 50) Still, to the British, the conference had successfully created a working border between China and India. However, apart from negotiating an international border with a province of China, and not the central government, there were several loose ends to the treaty. For one, the line was drawn, for the most part, arbitrarily, without consideration for natural geographical features. Second, Tibet would still be allowed to levy and collect taxes in the areas south of the line that now became part of India. (Maxwell 52) Third, the position of the line went above the line of direct administration the British had used in India. It would appear the British were in competition with the Chinese for control of the peoples of this area for one, and to expand the territory of India further north, for the line gave India the noticeable acquisition of the city of Tawang. (Maxwell 61)
With the conclusion of the McMahon Line, the boundaries were now set for India and Tibet, and though the boundary had many problems that needed to be worked out, those problems would not be dealt with until roughly forty years later, since both India and China would spend the next several decades struggling to oust unpopular regimes and establishing new governments. It was not until several years after the British had departed India and Chiang Kai- Shek had fled to Taiwan that tensions began to flare over Tibet and its border with India. Right away, in 1950, did Beijing look to assert its authority over Lhasa. India, concerned over what it understood as its border, began to take its own actions to assert itself.
Newly independent India quickly picked up where the British had left off, entering and having Sikkim, Nepal, and Bhutan all sign treaties that left them economically and politically dependent on India. (Maxwell 68) In addition, Indian troops in 1951 moved, for the first time, all the way up to the McMahon Line and reclaimed the city of Tawang from Tibet, since for the remainder of British control and even the first several years of independence, the government of India still limited its direct authority south of the line, even though the line was the supposed border. (Maxwell 73) Indeed, the fact that India did not control up to the line, and that exactly what the line was was still an unresolved question, can be further evidenced by the fact that to better enter Tibet, the Chinese had entered and crossed Aksai Chin. The Chinese entertained no problem in this because they saw Aksai Chin as Chinese territory. India, though it claimed Aksai Chin as its own, did not notice the Chinese had used Aksai Chin as an entry into Tibet, meaning that India had not been patrolling or using the area. (Rowland 52)
What was noticed by India, though, was that by occupying and reaffirming control of Tibet, Chinese authority was becoming too close for Indian comfort. Demonstrations were held in India that were critical of Beijing’s actions in Tibet. Indians were concerned with two problems the “liberation of Tibet” would cause- one being the potential loss of trade for Indian goods, and secondly, the encroachment of communism. The Chinese opposed discussions in India’s parliament concerning the affairs of China. The Chinese also viewed India’s reaction towards the retaking of Tibet as a far cry from India’s non- alignment stance. Beijing claimed that by supporting Tibet, and denouncing China, India was also supporting the west, and therefore imperialistic. Mao Zedong questioned India’s policy, stating ‘one either leans to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Neutrality is mere camouflage and the third way does not exist.’ (Kini 83) The Indian argument seemed clearly to agree with Mao’s view, for Krishna Menon had said that, ‘the British government of India had undertaken to support the independence of Tibet subject to the suzerainty of China. Independent India had, in a sense, inherited this commitment.’ (Vertzberger 332)
It was not until the middle of the 1950’s that the governments of India and China brought up the question of discussing the borders. By this time, it should be noted that the border between India and China had still not been officially marked. Both sides still had claims to the territory, and the Simla Convention had not laid out a permanent agreement. For one, the British had provided at the conference that the lines would be open for reinterpretation at a later date, (Maxwell 52) and this can serve as a British admission that the line was a poorly done one and would need more work. In addition, a map showing the McMahon Line published in 1935 in a collection of treaties included a note that the Chinese had not ratified the treaty. The unofficial state of the McMahon Line was further illustrated by the fact that the maps used in Nehru’s own book did not even show the line. (Maxwell 210) Even as late as 1954 did Indian maps show the McMahon Line as unfinalized, and, even more curiously, not only were Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan all included in India, no border at all between India and China was marked west of Nepal, and the map noted that the border was undefined. (Maxwell 83) Another flaw in the state of affairs after the Simla Convention was allowing Tibet to continue to exercise control in Tawang well into the 1940’s. (Hoffman 20)
India, however, complained that maps published in China placed the border south of the McMahon Line in the east, as far down in some places as the Bhramaputra River, and in the west included areas that India claimed, notably Aksai Chin. Nehru advised Indians not to be too concerned, as India was full sure of its claim and possession of the territory, and Chou Enlai answered that the Chinese maps were based on older maps, such as the nineteenth century British maps that did indeed recognize the western areas as Chinese territory. (Maxwell 96) Apparently, when the Chinese refused to answer the British proposal in 1899 to divide Aksai Chin, the government of India must have assumed that China had agreed to the plan. (Maxwell 34) The Chinese did make a proposal, however. In their dispute with Burma, the Chinese had accepted the McMahon Line as the border. Similar agreements were made with Nepal. Chou Enlai insisted that if China had agreed to the line with other nations, it would be willing to do so with India also. China would recognize the McMahon Line in NEFA, but in exchange would want India to accede to Chinese claims in Aksai Chin. (Hoffman 87) India refused, calling China’s placement of the disputed territory in China as imperialistic and expansionist. Shortly afterward, though, Indian maps began to appear that clearly defined the borders they had once listed as undefined, and the Indians began claiming that the borders were well known and had existed for a long time, though even on the Indian side there was still some uncertainty about what exactly those borders were. (Vertzberger 106) Perhaps in an effort to promote national support, India issued the statement that it was well known that ancient Sanskrit texts and epics had all described India as the land south of the Himalaya. (Paul Borders 10) China could have refuted this using the argument that Chinese texts referred to China as the middle kingdom and had sovereignty over the entire world. Instead, China pointed to the maps, the treaties, and the statements from India, and said that India had no real proof, or claim, “apart from citing ancient epics and legends which cannot serve as bases.” (Report of Chinese and Indian Officials 73) It was obvious at this point that there was a legitimate border question. India fully supported the denouement of the Simla Convention, though China had not.
China rejected the Simla Convention as a product of western imperialism. However, the Chinese were able to buttress their argument with the simple fact that they had never ratified the treaty, and therefore were not obligated to honor it. Chou Enlai reiterated, ‘No treaty or agreement on the Sino- Indian boundary has ever been concluded between the Chinese central government and the Indian government.’ (Lall 240) China’s main and most thorough argument was that Tibet is a province of China and not an independent state, regardless of any special privileges Tibet may have through treaties with the Qing. As a province, then, Tibet simply did not have any authority to negotiate with another nation as though independent.
According to India, a Chinese ratification of the Simla Convention was never required anyway, as “the boundary expressed the political and geographic realities of the situation between the two actual neighbors, India and Tibet.” (Lall 217) India also turned to the historical argument to denounce China as being imperialistic. “Peking’s main reason for rejecting the Simla Convention stems from China’s basic and traditional unwillingness to relinquish rights to territory which it considers to be eternally part of the ‘celestial’ realm. The idea of negotiating on equal terms with a country it considered to be vassal prejudiced China against any reasonable solution from the start.” (Rowland 49)
The two governments were able to agree on Panchsheel, five principles of non-violence, non- involvement, and peaceful cooperation. However, with the border not also resolved through peaceful negotiation, it would now have to be decided through violence. Twice, first at Niti and later at Shipki La, the Chinese entered the disputed territory and then withdrew, and “it may be surmised that these were probing actions to test Indian reactions.” (Lall 240)
But by far, the most controversial action, and the one with the most severe ramifications, was the construction of a road into Tibet by the Chinese over Aksai Chin. The road was built to facilitate transport of supplies and equipment into Tibet, and became widely used during the Tibetan uprising of the late 1950’s. Using this road, the Chinese were able to enter Tibet easily, forcing the Dalai Lama to flee. There was another wave of anti- Chinese sentiment in India, and this was escalated even further when India granted asylum to the Dalai Lama. China did not protest the asylum, especially when Nehru made it clear that India was only giving the Dalai Lama asylum, not providing a platform to further criticize China. The Dalai Lama was expected to remain in India in a state of political silence. (Hoffman 66) Yet once safely in India, the Dalai Lama soon resumed his political agenda. Chinese protest to this fell on deaf ears, prompting the Chinese accusation that the uprising in Tibet was being “instigated and abetted” (Renmin Ribao 3) by India. China also used the argument that Indian involvement in Tibet was in violation of the Panchsheel agreements. (Chaudhuri 11)
India viewed the construction and use of the road on what Indians considered their territory as an invasion. China argued that India’s refusal to allow the Chinese to use the road, and also refusal to debate whether or not it really was Indian land, was also a violation of the mutual advancement goal of the Panchsheel agreement. (Maxwell 268) Minor skirmishes began to occur between Chinese and Indian border patrol parties. On one such exchange, at Kongka Pass, Indian soldiers reported that they had been captured and tortured by the Chinese and were forced to sign a confession that they recognized the territory as Chinese. (Rowland 132) With an open conflict now, India proposed that each side withdraw to the borderline as claimed by the other. However, this arrangement would require India to draw back only a small area, while China would have to abandon thousands of square miles of territory. (Maxwell 142) Another Indian proposal called for each country to simply withdraw to their own side of the line. The problem with that proposal was that the line to be used was the Indian claim line. (Maxwell 129) If China were to accept either deal, then it would be recognizing India’s claims and dismissing its own. Chou Enlai’s proposal was each side to remain where they were at present and to maintain that status quo until proper negotiations could take place and limn an official border. (Maxwell 136) India rejected this idea, claiming that China had unlawfully entered Indian territory, occupied it, and now were trying to bargain for it.
China’s main claim was Aksai Chin, and that because of the road into Tibet. But soon, the border dispute expanded to include the smaller Himalayan states. India accused China of infiltrating into these countries, inciting unrest, and attempting to wrest control of them. China countered by pointing out the unfair treaties India had signed with the Himalayan states at the beginning of the decade as a measure to limit Chinese influence. Indians rebutted by saying that, “India was accused of crimes of aggression and expansion communist China itself intended to commit.” (Rowland 52) Nehru insisted on being firm on the status of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim, as well as protecting Indian sovereignty over Ladakh. India recognized the competition for influence in these areas and explained that, “Just as Imperial Britain believed that it needed Tibet as a buffer zone for India, China believes it needs the Himalayan border states as buffers for Tibet.” (Rowland 183) Chinese propaganda reverberated the sentiment, averring that, “Tibet is China’s palm. Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Ladakh, and the Northeast Frontier Agency of Assam are the five fingers. Now that the palm has been restored to China, the fingers should go with it.” (Rowland 144)
But in order to acquire its “fingers,” China would have to compete not only with India, but also with the Soviet Union. Nehru had reassured that India need not worry about China because Russia was the leader of the communist world, and as far as the communist bloc was concerned, Russia would put China in place, as India had a good relationship with the Soviet Union. (Vertzberger 88) As the skirmishes escalated, the Chinese realized that from their Indian adversaries “a neutral attitude was impossible,” since Indians were attacking using Soviet weapons and claiming neutrality. (Renmin Ribao 6) But the largest role played by the Russians was to come in 1960. In that year, the Russians abruptly ceased to supply weapons to the Chinese when, after making inquisition as to why the weapons were being stored in the undeveloped and unused areas of western China, the Russians were shown detailed plans for an invasion of Kashmir with intentions of reclaiming Ladakh, and in turn quickly warned the Indians of Chinese designs. (Sinha 48) This information confirmed the Indian belief that China had signed the Panchsheel agreement only as a measure of buying time to plan for a large- scale invasion later on. (Chaudhuri 43) Soviet support of India throughout the border dispute would factor into the cleft between China and the Soviet Union later on.
Communism played another key role in the Sino- Indian border question. Many Indians saw China’s occupation of the disputed areas as an attempt to spread communism into India, arguing that, “It is clear that the leaders of Red China are pinning their faith blindly in the doctrine of exporting communism.” (Das 80) India had recently seen Kerala elect a communist government, and Beijing’s decisive action in Tibet helped raise Indian concerns over communism. The border war then also became a struggle to preserve Indian democracy. “What we are facing today is not merely a violation of the country’s territorial integrity but a ruthless and unscrupulous on our freedom, our democratic values and our way of life.” (Mohammad 78) There was also concern as to what would be the reaction of the Communist Party of India. However, the party put to rest any doubts before long, announcing that their national patriotism was greater than their doctrinal loyalty. The Communist Party of India denounced China, and claimed to do so, “even at the risk of isolation from the international communism.” (External Publicity Division 6) The party went further in supporting the effort against China in its statement made by Ajoy Ghosh, who said that in defending against China, ‘the Government of India would be justified in taking all measures to repel the Chinese forces. In such a situation, the Communist Party of India would support all the measures taken by the Government of India.” (CPI India-China 56)
By 1962, still no agreement had been reached. Nehru stated that India “shall always favor peace provided that peace is a honorable one, one that leaves our territory in our hands,” (Nehru 65) yet India had rejected all Chinese proposals for peace, and would be satisfied with nothing less that a complete Chinese withdrawal from all disputed areas. China had pointed out that it had actually been using Aksai Chin for over a decade without any complaint from India until 1958, and that this free use of the land is what prompted the construction of the road. If Indians were so concerned over the sanctity of their lands, the Chinese argued, why had nothing been said sooner? (Chinese Foreign Ministry 19) In May of 1962, India offered to allow the Chinese use of the Aksai Chin road in exchange for an evacuation of all other land in question, but China refused this offer as the lands or Aksai Chin were truly Indian. (Hoffman 107)
While India continued to creep further and further northward, China began to become wary of Indian expansionist plans. In the fall of 1961, India had fortified its military strength along the border. China viewed this action as a Russian backed Indian build up for an invasion. (Maxwell 286) But the greatest argument for China was that India had altered the McMahon Line. The line was drawn relatively straight, so that when Indians began to regularly patrol it, they realized adjustments were needed to accommodate natural geographic obstacles. However, these adjustments all were in favor of India and done without consulting China. (Hoffman 69) These adjustments can be viewed as either Indian expansion or as simple border realignments permissible under international law. But what was not permissible by the Indians was the establishment of bases north of the line. Throughout the border dispute, India had always asserted that the McMahon Line was the standard and true border between India and China. Therefore, then, any activity north of the line would be, by India’s own decree, in Chinese territory. India set up a base at Khinzemane, north of the line, and the Chinese, though they complained, allowed the base to stand. (Maxwell 293) Later on, though, after the establishment of another base north of the line, at Dhola, China began to protest. India then made an offer for each side to maintain the status quo, an offer the Chinese quickly rejected for the same reason India had rejected the similar Chinese offer. In addition, China adroitly pointed out that if India can make minor adjustments to the McMahon Line, then not only should China also be allowed to do so, but even more importantly, India was silently admitting that the McMahon Line was not a sound border and needed to be renegotiated. (Maxwell 299) India refused the Chinese invitation to send a delegate to discuss the complete redrawing of the line.
With tensions rising and border incidents becoming more frequent and more hostile, China launched a large- scale attack of India in late 1962. The war was fought on two fronts, both in the western area near Aksai Chin, and in the east along the McMahon Line in NEFA. But very soon into the war, circumstances had already begun to look bleak for the Indians, for “by and large, the army offered little resistance to the Chinese.” (Prasad 7)
Many Indians viewed the war as a horrible betrayal of India by China. Nehru had hoped to firmly establish at Bandung an Asian bloc, and Chou Enlai, though this statement would come later, had offered promise by saying, ‘Our two people’s common interest in their struggle against imperialism outweigh by far all the differences between our two countries.” (Enlai, Oct. 24 36) India now saw itself as the victim of a sudden, unprovoked attack by China. Nehru said that in the Chinese invasion, “we see the grossest form of imperialism functioning here across our borders in India. China has said often enough that it is anti- imperialist. Now we see this so- called anti- imperialist country becoming itself an imperialist of the worst kind and committing aggression and invading a friendly country without rhyme or reason or excuse and justifying it by saying that they are being attacked. I must confess that I have seldom come across such a travesty of truth and decency in international behavior.” (Nehru 92) Further sentiment of betrayal was expressed in sayings such as, “We have been rewarded by China with trickery, chicanery, and faithlessness in return for our steadfastness, goodwill, and peaceability,” (Das 80) and “Falsehood and deception marked the Chinese Government’s policy towards India.” (Fraudulent Peace 3) The Chinese remarked that it was India who had rejected all offers at peace, and had forced themselves into this “Himalayan adventure” (Das 81) to secure the borders it claimed. Mao criticized India’s deceptiveness in its secret meetings and realigning of the McMahon Line, and said that Nehru is a man of “two faces, one is that of a man of peace, the other that of a demon.” (Menon 32)
Nehru’s envisioned Asian bloc would have India and China working together under Panchsheel, leading the continent, and making a large impact on the world. The border war shattered not only Nehru’s dream, but also Nehru’s spirit. Aside from the modern political implications of the war, having the largest democracy face the largest communist regime, the border war also was a competition between the two cradles of Asian civilization over influence in Asia. The general view was that China was adamant about being itself the dominant power in Asia, and to be so would have to put India down. Nehru admitted that, “The basic challenge in Southeast Asia is between India and China,” (Vertzberger 98) while Malaysian Prime Minister Tengku Rahaman warned that, “China does not want a rival in this part of the world.” (Menon 43) The view, then, was that India was nothing more than an obstacle in China’s way. “One thing is certain and that is, Mao wants to dominate Asia, if not the world. Only this can explain the recent Chinese invasion of India. India is the only country that can challenge China militarily, politically, and economically in Asia. It is Mao’s aim to humiliate India, militarily, isolate politically, and cripple economically to prove his maxim –the third way does not exist.” (Kini 84)
It would appear China was not the only nation that wanted to dispel the theory of non- alignment. The competition for influence in India was contested by the west and Soviet Union, who both supplied aid to India. By being non- aligned, India had not gone against either side, but then had also not gone for either side. This prevented either side from completely supporting India. “China’s aggression came as a God- send to the imperialist circles who were also out to humiliate India.” (Chaudhuri 53)
The celerity and ease that the Chinese had in overcoming Indian troops did have one other effect, and that was to gather international support for India’s claims. China was portrayed worldwide as a predator attacking an innocent. Indian losses helped give credence to Indian comments of China, such as one by Krishna Menon that said, “It is strange that in modern times, a country disregards international ethics and stoops almost to the level of medieval barbarism.” (Menon 31) Another popular view that began to circulate is that China had no regard for humanity, and was hoping to drag this border dispute into a mass war of attrition between the world’s two most populous nations. “For the Chinese leaders human life means nothing… since they have more than enough of them freely available.” (Menon 40) “It is heartlessly believed that this war would also help in balancing their population explosion. This policy envisages the cutting of human beings like carrots. To the communist masters of China, there is nothing wrong in this policy as it is the antidote to their population problem.” (Das 81) Mao did little to rebuke this argument, stating that, ‘China has 600 million people. Even if 200 million people were killed… 400 million would still survive. Even if 400 million people were killed, 200 million would still survive. Even if 200 million survived, China would still constitute a big country of the world.’ (Kini 83)
Whether or not “the events of October had indeed suggested that China’s objective in India was total conquest of the subcontinent,” (Rowland 171) can be determined by the lines of combat and the shape of the peace agreement. Maps used by the Indian military that showed movement and battles indicated heavy Indian activity north of the McMahon Line, clearly in Chinese territory. (Prasad 44) As for China’s grand expansionist schemes, China took control of Aksai Chin, captured Dhola and Tawang , and pushed the Indians back south of the McMahon Line. (Maxwell 361) China made an offer for each side to withdraw twenty kilometers from what the Chinese called the “line of actual control.” India rejected the proposal, calling it not a Chinese proposal for peace, but a sneaky trick to annex Indian territory by forcing Indians to retreat into their own territory and give it to China. The Chinese were denounced as being “adept in the art of double talk.” (Paul Line 57) However, it should be noted that if India had accepted to move to that line, China would have been retreating from far more territory. China would have had to withdraw to a point that was north of the McMahon Line, a situation that would allow India to keep the post at Khinzemane. (Maxwell 374) For the “line of actual control,” the Chinese used as reference the line as it was on November 7, 1959. India wanted to use the line as of September 8, 1962. This line would have placed practically all disputed territory into Indian hands. (Maxwell 418) China stated that it could not accept India’s proposal because that would entail the transfer of enough land to appear as though India was the winning nation. China argued that during the dispute, the Indian government “not only occupied 90,000 square kilometers of Chinese territory south of the illegal McMahon Line… it is also insatiable and wants to occupy another 33,000 square kilometers of Chinese territory.” (Renmin Ribao 9) Also, as India criticized Chinese maps that incorporated the disputed territory, Chou Enlai, in a letter to Nehru, pointed out that, ‘According to the original map, the western end of the so- called McMahon Line clearly starts from 27, 44.6’ N. Yet the Indian Government arbitrarily said that it started from 27, 48’ N.’ (Enlai November 4 39) The line used by China did, for the most part, did honor all of India’s claims. The McMahon Line would be the border in the east, with extra territory at that. The only notable Chinese acquisition was Aksai Chin. By submitting a proposal that forfeited all other gains and only keeping that one area, the Chinese were backing their argument that they had no other designs and only wanted Aksai Chin out of the entire dispute. (Hoffman 182)
Since the Chinese were victorious, they could easily have made harsher demands on India. While China did later recant their acceptance of the Colombo Proposals after India had accepted, they had initially accepted quite readily. (Chaudhuri 52) A possible reason China may have renounced their acceptance was because the Colombo talks had a distinct pro- Indian platform. In addition, while China had already agreed, India was stalling and refused to sign an agreement that would cede any territory. At the Colombo conference, “there was never any objection or indeed comment of any kind by the Chinese Government at the time regarding the boundary between India and Tibet as shown on the treaty map.” (Chinese Aggression-Some Facts 3) India’s procrastination and China’s lack of aggressiveness in peace demands began to sway opinion, leading some to believe that perhaps the Chinese were not the angry imperialists the Indians made them out to be. “The Chinese move came as a surprise only because the Indian version of what was happening was so widely accepted.” (Maxwell 418) Chou Enlai described the Chinese stance by saying, ‘The fact that the Chinese government’s proposal has taken as its basis the 1959 line of actual control and not the present line of actual contact… is full proof that the Chinese side has not tried to force any unilateral demand on the Indian side on account of the advances gained.’ (Maxwell 376) A noted observer to this border conflict was Vietnam, and the Vietnamese made the observation that, “In the two conflicts with India in 1959 and 1962, Beijing clearly demonstrated its restraint. After giving India a heavy lesson, China did not attempt a greater military victory over India in either case. The unilateral withdrawal of its forces… indicated unmistakingly that the Chinese military behavior was well calculated and fully under control.” (Chen 4) Vietnam’s attitude towards China would change shortly afterward.
Similar to the situation with the British in India, the Chinese also felt they were the victims of French imperialism. In the aftermath of the 1884 Sino- French War, China had to relinquish all claims to Vietnam as a tributary state and recognize French dominance in Indochina. A border was drawn in the treaty after the war, finished in 1887, and then amended in 1895. The land border appeared to be solidly demarked. However, the aquatic boundary was not so well defined. A line was drawn through the Gulf of Tonkin, with the provision that all islands west of the line would be controlled by Vietnam and all islands east would be under Chinese authority. But, the treaty also made the point that the line in the gulf was not a border, just a marker to decide possession of the islands. (Chen 39) The significance of splitting the gulf had not as much to do with the smaller islands in it, but rather two larger archipelagos, the Paracel and Spratley Islands. Though the treaty deals more specifically with the smaller islands in the gulf, both archipelagos are located in the South China Sea, far east of the line, and therefore should be Chinese. (Chang 14) But both sides continued to debate and claim possession. Using the argument that the treaty that made this arrangement at the end of the nineteenth century by the Sino- French Convention on the Delimitation of the Frontier was not decided by the Vietnamese and the Chinese, but by the French and the Qing Manchus, China argued that both sides should disregard the treaties and redraw the borders, including the gulf. (Kaushik 112)
As it would turn out though, the 1979 war between China and Vietnam stemmed not so much out of a territorial dispute than it did competition for dominance in Southeast Asia. Mao, in 1965, had said, ‘We must by all means seize Southeast Asia… this region is rich in raw materials- it is worth the costs involved.’ (CPI Vietnam 15) Once the war for independence against the west had been complete, the three countries of Indochina began to have their own disputes. These disputes were in turn influenced by the competition between China and Vietnam. That competition was in turn influenced by the competition between China and the Soviet Union. In that regard, Southeast Asia became a region of multi- layered loyalty and aggression.
Vietnam had benefited by receiving aid from both Russia and China during all throughout its war to oust the French and later reunify the nation. When the Sino- Soviet split occurred, Vietnam played the role of deceiver, taking advantage of the two communist powers vying for influence with their aid, continuing to ask for, and receiving aid from both sides. Russian aid was used to finance the war, while Chinese aid went for supplies. (Lawson 179) As the aid continued to come, and the two sides continued to compete, the Chinese began to become wary of Vietnam’s actions. China offered Vietnam increased aid and promises of more support, though in exchange Vietnam would have to reject Soviet aid, leading to the observation that, “The Chinese leaders have made a great effort to organize an international anti- Soviet ‘crusade.’” (CPI Vietnam 19) As the war continued, though, the aid continued to come from both sides. However, once the war was ended, and Vietnam was a unified communist country, it was clear that Vietnam would have to choose one side. A military agreement allowing use of Cam Rahm Bay was signed, and the Soviet- Viet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1978 proved a heavy blow to Chinese ambitions in Southeast Asia, as China charged the treaty was just an attempt by Russia to check China’s communist clout. (Chen 27) China realized that since it had lost Vietnam, it would have to double its efforts for the rest of Indochina. But to do so, China would have to compete directly with Vietnam.
It was obvious, to the Vietnamese, that Laos would not side with China. When Laos and Thailand became engaged in a border conflict, Vietnam instantly sent troops to assist Laos, leading to poor Thai- Viet relations, and gravitated Thailand towards China. (Ross 78) In another incident, some 30, 000 Chinese were in Laos, building a network of roads along the northern border with China in 1975. At Vietnam’s request, the Pathet Lao asked the Chinese to leave. (Lawson 281) Laos was somewhat fearful of a possible Vietnamese takeover, however it quickly became involved in Vietnam’s plan for dominance of the region, the Indochina Federation. (Chen 27) The federation would be a union of the three states under the ideal of mutual advancement, though the federation would most certainly be under the direction of Hanoi. With Laos secured, Vietnam turned to its other Indochinese neighbor, though Cambodia would not be as easily won over. The two countries had their own border dispute, and there was regular violence along the border. In addition, the Khmer Rouge had forced out many ethnic Vietnamese, who returned to Vietnam along with many more Cambodian refugees. With the border troubles, and the Khmer refusing to join the Indochina Federation, Vietnam sponsored a coup of the Khmer Rouge in 1977. (Chen 34) Since the Khmer Rouge were against Hanoi, that made them, by default, allies of China, and so Cambodia received aid in their struggle against the Vietnamese. Thus, the “partition” of Southeast Asia was now complete into pro- Soviet/ pro- Viet and pro- Chinese spheres. (Ross 81) However, with the Khmer purgings now in action, “Chinese leaders were presumably uncomfortable publicly embracing such a leadership, calling it a ‘friend.’” (Ross 110) Thus, Sino- Cambodian relations were strengthened as a counter to Soviet- Viet relations. (Ross 75) Vietnam denounced China, alleging that their support of Cambodia was imperialistic, and that, “Like all great powers, China wants to have either weak neighbors, or better yet, puppet neighbors.” (Lawson 193) China, though, could easily have said the same about Vietnam, regarding the Indochina Federation.
Though both sides had agreed to seek a peaceful solution to the border problem, (Ross 75) violence again broke out along the Cambodia- Vietnam border, with the Khmer Rouge invasion of the Vietnamese town of Tay Ninh. General Giap countered with a full- scale invasion into Cambodia, not a defense of the town, that pushed Vietnam 10 miles into Cambodia, up to Parrot’s Beak. (Ross 156) When Cambodia did not surrender and leave Tay Ninh, Vietnam intensified its invasion, and drove even further into Cambodia. But despite the heavy bombardment by the Vietnamese, Cambodia refused to relinquish its hold, as it was immensely aided by China. (Ross 177) However, despite Chinese aid, Vietnam proved too powerful, and, in 1979, Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge were forced to flee. Vietnam placed Heng Samrin in control of Cambodia as a puppet, arranged the signing of the Vietnamese- Kampuchean Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation, allowing Vietnam involvement in Cambodian affairs and a military occupation of Cambodia, and thus completed the Indochina Federation. (Chen 38) China had thus lost all its influence in Southeast Asia to Vietnam, something Beijing saw as unacceptable. Deng Xiaoping announced that Vietnam would no longer be allowed ‘to go swashbuckling in Laos, Kampuchea, or even in the Chinese border areas.’ (Ray 106)
It was in early 1979 that China felt the time was right for “teaching Vietnam a good lesson.” (Ray 73) Aside from the Cambodian question, the territorial disputes and the treatment of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam all weighed heavily in the Chinese decision to invade Vietnam. Hanoi had once said that it had chosen the Soviet Union over China because that would stop the Vietnamese speculation that China sought to flood the country with Chinese immigrants as a measure of reducing China’s overpopulation. (Van Canh 241) This belief was fueled by the Chinese offer to restructure the border to accommodate the ethnic minorities on either side, a situation that would benefit China more than Vietnam, and a deal the Hanoi rejected by saying that the Sino- French treaties clearly defined the border and if the ethnic Chinese were uncomfortable they could return to China. (Ross 152) China lashed out at the quarantine of Chinese Hoa.. The persecution included not only the closing off of the Hoa in the slums of Ho Chi Minh City, but also the confiscation of stocks from Chinese merchants. (Van Canh 240) In addition, Vietnam began sweeping the border area with China, removing the Hoa. Vietnam claimed that its motive in clearing the border area was not to deport or bully the ethnic Chinese, but simply to avoid a possible conflict with China. (Chen 64) However, with the restraints placed on them, myriads of ethnic Chinese began to leave Vietnam and return to China, doing so by the thousands. Eventually, nearly 200 thousand refugees would enter China, leading Beijing to harshly criticize Vietnam as unhumanitarian. Vietnam pointed out that the Chinese had made no protest when their allies, the Khmer Rouge, had also forced thousands of ethnic Chinese from Cambodia, and had killed many others. (Ray 80)
Before the invasion, though, there were attempts made to clear up the border and territorial dispute. Back in 1887, both the French and the Qing had agreed that the line drawn in the Gulf of Tonkin was not a border. However, when China later raised the question about creating a borderline in the gulf, Vietnam argued that the line was indeed a standing aquatic boundary. (Chen 40) China argued that the line had only been a marker to determine possession of the islands in the gulf, and not the division of the body of water itself. In addition were the two archipelagos, that were not only claimed by both China and Vietnam, but also by Taiwan and the Philippines. The latter two countries would rescind their claims. The debate for ownership of the islands might not have become such a heated one were it not for the presence of oil, a commodity coveted by both nations. (Chen 41) Another argument made by both sides regarding the archipelagos was the traditional possession and use of them. Both governments released documents that showed long standing ties and ownership. Hanoi contended that it was the Vietnamese who had not only discovered the Paracels, but had levied taxes on their inhabitants since the seventeenth century, while archaeological finds reveal artifacts from early China. (Chang 62)
China made an official claim on the Paracels and Spratleys in 1951, claiming that they had been returned to China from Japan as part of the Allied Treaty signed with the Japanese. (Chang 18) At an international meeting, Vietnam laid claim to the archipelagos, and during the border dispute would assert that the islands were definitely the property of Vietnam, since no country had opposed the claim when it was made at the meeting, a meeting China did not attend. (Chang 18) In 1955, the Chinese and Vietnamese met, reviewed the ground border, and both agreed that the line drawn by the French and the Qing was well defined, sound, and needed no renegotiating. (Chinese Aggression 21) At a second meeting later in the decade, the two sides would again agree to maintain the status quo of the present border. China, though, would later argue that it had only agreed to temporarily keep the status quo because of the war situation and Vietnam, and would wait until Vietnam was not boggled with its independence movement and settled before the border can be redrawn. (Chang 37) Another offer was made by China to rework the land border, and China was prepared to make cessions to Vietnam on the mainland, but this was because China was adamant on its stand regarding the Paracels and Spratleys. (Ross 38) China made one other attempt at initiating a renegotiation of the land border, making the argument that the rivers that ran along the land border were, like the Gulf of Tonkin, also not clearly defined and should be redone, with the signing of a new treaty after the complete remarkation of the border, an argument Vietnam gave little attention to. (Chang 39)
As for actual armed conflict, there were several major and a host of minor skirmishes along the border in the late 1970’s. One of the major incidents occurred when the Chinese constructed a railroad, and a stretch of that railroad crossed over the border and into Vietnamese territory. When Vietnam raised the issue, China refused to reroute the railroad, setting off fighting. (Chen 49) But the bulk of armed battles leading up to the Chinese invasion took place on the more disputed areas, the Paracels and Spratleys. In 1959, Diem’s regime in Saigon overran the Chinese and occupied the Paracels. (Chang 22) Later, on January 19, 1974, with the U.S. sponsored “nation” of South Vietnam set to collapse and be integrated into the north, China seized the opportunity to oust the Vietnamese and take back the Paracels. (Lawson 277) Hanoi, though, argued that as Saigon had taken the islands, and Hanoi had taken Saigon, the islands were therefore now under the authority of Hanoi, and newly reunified Vietnam. (Chang 22) When China refused to relinquish the Paracels, Vietnam seized the Spratleys. (Ray 117) Beijing saw Vietnam’s occupation of the Spratleys, and contest for the Paracels, as an insult and a backstab after all the economic and military aid China had given to Vietnam during its independence struggle. (Ross 40) China had another legitimate argument, though. Since the last official agreement between the two countries was the 1958 agreement to keep the status quo, and at the time China still controlled both archipelagos, Vietnam was then in violation of the current agreement. (Ray 117)
Thus, China invaded Vietnam. Vietnam speculated the Chinese invasion served only as a “testing ground for the Chinese army, who had had no actual fighting experience since the Sino- Indian border war- almost twenty years ago. The Chinese army would gain experience from this attack.” (Chen 94) China’s plan for attack was to first capture the northern strip along the border, and then to capture and level the towns of Cao Bang, Lang Son, and Lao Cai. (Chinese Aggression 11) China intended to be swift and firm so that, as Deng Xiaoping said, ‘in teaching Vietnam a lesson, the myth of Vietnamese invincibility and the claim that it is the third strongest military power in the world will be shattered.’ (Ray 106)
Vietnam’s rousing cry during the invasion was that, “By attacking a country that stands as a symbol of struggle for independence and freedom, the Beijing reactionaries have put down their mask of sham revolutionaries and revealed themselves as extremely dangerous reactionaries who oppose peace, national independence, democracy, and socialism.” (Cuong 95) The Chinese accomplished much of their goal, capturing the towns and inflicting damage of the Vietnamese. However, Chinese advances were not without a heavy cost of casualties. A war of attrition would not be an efficient strategy here. It was certain that the Chinese had underestimated their opponents. (Chinese Aggression 13)
The Vietnamese developed a defense strategy that worked well against the Chinese. Along the border where the invasion was initiated, Vietnam defended itself by using smaller, local militias, while the larger, better equipped forces lie in wait deeper into the country. As the Chinese advanced, they were able to cut through the militia, but suffered losses and were weakened. Once the diminished Chinese force progressed deep enough, the full- strength Vietnamese force would attack. (Chen 106) This tactic proved devastating, not only trapping the Chinese, but also cutting off their supply lines. The resulting condition was that the Chinese remained close to the border for the duration of the invasion, and did not penetrate much into the country, never more than 50 km into Vietnam, for fear of the attack by the large force in waiting. (Chen 108) Another bonus for the Vietnamese was that the border militias, intended to be sacrificed as a means of weakening the Chinese, did a bigger job than expected, and caused more Chinese casualties than initially hoped for. (Chen 107)
But though they suffered many casualties, China was the larger and better equipped army. Once China had captured its targets, the last being Land Son on March 2, (Chen 110) China began its lesson. In commenting on the Chinese treatment of the Vietnamese during the invasion, the Vietnamese proclaimed that, “Their barbarity was on a medieval scale and the means they used were modern.” (Chinese War Crimes 6) In addition to the slaughtering of Vietnamese peasants in the villages, with mutilations of the bodies, the Chinese also destroyed any and all networks of modernity and use to the people. Schools, hospitals, roads, bridges, offices, and even electric and telephone wires were all destroyed, showing that the true Chinese intent was not to capture and keep any territory, but simply to cripple the economy by devastating towns and eliminating any and all progress made by independent Vietnam. (Chinese War Crimes 10)
Further evidence that China had no goal in Vietnam other than aggression was that as soon as the massacres took place, China withdrew. (Chinese Aggression 33) The withdrawal took place on March 5, 1979, just days after the occupation of Lang Son. Perhaps China withdrew because it had suffered too many casualties itself and decided prolonged involvement in Vietnam would only lead to more Chinese losses. (Chen 110) But to the Vietnamese, China left not because the border question would still remain unresolved, including sovereignty over the island groups, but because the Chinese had done the damage they intended, because, “The Chinese completed the large- scale destruction that the U.S. imperialists left unfinished.” (Chinese War Crimes 6) Genera l Giap called the Chinese ‘war criminals, worse than Hitler,’ (Ray 101) and the sentiment of the Chinese as genocidal was echoed in the exclamation that, “the crimes against the Vietnamese people perpetrated by the Chinese ‘People’s Liberation Army’ are comparable only to similar ‘exploits’ by the Khmer Rouge.” (Chinese War Crimes 9)
In both conflicts, China launched the attack, but not before making several attempts at a peaceful solution to the border question. Both wars could be viewed as imperialism, but not necessarily as Chinese imperialism, as both India and Vietnam also had clear goals in mind in terms of land acquisition and cementing of spheres of influence. It is not possible to completely condemn China because India and Vietnam both violated their own terms and both had ambitions of their own. However, it is clear that China is culpable as well, due to its belief that it is Asia’s premier power and its clear intentions to prove itself as such. The wars also show the importance of nationalism. Both India and Vietnam fought long struggles for their independence against European powers, as China had long fought with itself to establish a new government. However small and seemingly insignificant China’s demand might be, either the top of a hill in the Himalayas not otherwise used or a few square kilometers stretched out over several hundred miles, that is still territory that was fought for and earned through decades of revolution, and the two countries were not willing to simply hand those lands over to China. At the same time, it is clear that both wars could have been avoided, or at least mitigated, by cooperation and compliance to renegotiate borders that were not clearly defined and needed work anyway.

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TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN POST-INDEPENDENCE ASIA

Frank Cavitolo
History 53.11